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Artificial Intelligence and the Body:  
Dreyfus, Bickhard, and the Future of AI 
Daniel Susser 
Abstract. For those who find Dreyfus’s critique of AI compelling, the prospects 
for producing true artificial human intelligence are bleak.  An important question 
thus becomes, what are the prospects for producing artificial non-human intelli-
gence?  Applying Dreyfus’s work to this question is difficult, however, because 
his work is so thoroughly human-centered.  Granting Dreyfus that the body is fun-
damental to intelligence, how are we to conceive of non-human bodies?  In this 
paper, I argue that bringing Dreyfus’s work into conversation with the work of 
Mark Bickhard offers a way of answering this question, and I try to suggest what 
doing so means for AI research. 
 
Hubert Dreyfus’s groundbreaking work in the philosophy of mind has demonstrat-
ed conclusively that the body is fundamental to all facets of intelligent life.1  Thus 
Dreyfus has put to rest once and for all the formalist fantasy of a purely algorith-
mic, disembodied mind.2  Furthermore, Dreyfus’s constructive phenomenological 
work on skillful coping provides compelling reasons to believe that producing ar-
tificial human intelligence would effectively require replicating the human body, 
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1 This work first appeared in manuscript form in Dreyfus’s (1972) What Computers Can’t 
Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason, and was revised in 1979 and again in 1992, at which 
point it was re-issued by MIT Press under the title What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Cri-
tique of Artificial Reason.  As Dreyfus notes in the “Introduction to the Revised Edition,” 
the book has remained largely intact since its first appearance, with only minor changes 
and new introductions with each new edition.  All citations in this paper refer to the 
(1993) MIT Press second printing, as indicated in the list of references. 
2 Jerry Fodor, the arch-formalist, writes some ten years after Dreyfus first presented his  
argument, “If someone—a Dreyfus, for example—were to ask us why we should even 
suppose that the digital computer is a plausible mechanism for the simulation of global 
cognitive processes, the answering silence would be deafening,” quoted in Dreyfus, 
“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenome-
nology of Everyday Expertise,” 2005 APA Pacific Division Presidential Address.  Also 
see Bickhard and Terveen (1995), 42-44. 
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socializing and enculturating it into everyday human life, and developing its  
capacities in more or less the same way human beings develop.3  For those who 
take this account to be true, the question of artificial human intelligence has there-
fore ceased, more or less, to be a philosophical question, and has become instead a 
question for engineers.  The question of whether or not artificial human intelli-
gence is possible (and what the conditions of its possibility are) has become the 
question of whether or not it is technologically feasible to replicate the human 
body, embed the replica in human society, and so on. 
Yet even in the wake of this analysis important philosophical questions remain 
unresolved.  If one assumes, as I do, that producing artificial human intelligence 
(so conceived) is not feasible, a principal question becomes whether it is possible 
and what it might mean to produce some form of artificial non-human intelli-
gence.  After all, we find myriad forms of intelligence in the natural world: most 
people ascribe intelligence to cats and dogs; dolphins are without a doubt intelli-
gent; and even certain birds and octopuses have demonstrated intelligent behavior.  
And while we can’t necessarily understand such intelligent creatures fully, we can 
certainly understand some of them well enough to interact intelligently with them.  
Thus even if it’s the case that we cannot produce artificial human intelligence, we 
might want to produce some other form of intelligence, some kind of intelligence 
which is neither human-like nor dog-like nor dolphin-like, but which is usefully or 
interestingly intelligent nonetheless.   
If that is the case, however, we should need to ask whether and how Dreyfus’s 
arguments about human intelligence pertain to such potential alternatives.  Specif-
ically, if the body is fundamental to all facets of intelligent life, it is presumably 
the case that any plausible form of non-human intelligence will have one.  But 
what does that mean?  What would an artificial non-human body look like?  What 
is sufficient for constituting one?  Indeed, what is it that all the various kinds of in-
telligent creatures found naturally have in common?  What is common to human 
bodies and dog bodies and octopus bodies?  Dreyfus’s work doesn’t make this en-
tirely clear.  For his analyses of skillful coping are derived phenomenologically, 
which is to say they are framed in terms of and articulated from the perspective of 
Dreyfus’s own human subject position.  He takes for granted that the intelligence 
under consideration is human intelligence and that the body is a human body.4  In 
order to theorize artificial non-human intelligence while remaining true to Dreyfu-
sian intuitions, it is therefore necessary to expand Dreyfus’s analysis.   
My goal in what follows is to show how we might begin to do that, and to offer 
some thoughts on what expanding the analysis means, theoretically and practical-
ly, for future artificial intelligence research.  In order to do so, I attempt to bring 
Dreyfus’s work into conversation with the work of Mark Bickhard, whose “inte-
ractivist” theory of cognition resembles Dreyfus’s theory of skillful coping in cru-
cial ways.  Where they differ is that Bickhard’s theory is oriented at a much higher 
level of generality than Dreyfus’s.  Instead of being framed in terms of human in-
telligence and human bodies, Bickhard’s account is framed in terms of physical 
                                                          
3 See Dreyfus’s reply to Harry Collins in Dreyfus, “Responses,” in Heidegger, Coping, and 
Cognitive Science. Essays in Honor of Hubert L Dreyfus, vol. 2, ed. Mark A. Wrathall and 
Jeff Malpas, 314-349. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 345-6. 
4 Indeed, that it is a white, male, human body, etc. 
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systems generally.  And thus it offers a way of extracting from Dreyfus’s picture 
the basic features of bodies, common to all intelligent, embodied beings. 
In the first two sections, I very briefly outline Dreyfus’s theory of skillful cop-
ing and Bickhard’s interactivist theory of cognition.  Then I suggest how reading 
Dreyfus and Bickhard together offers a way of conceptualizing non-human intelli-
gence that remains true to Dreyfusian intuitions, and what such a conception 
means for the future of AI. 
1   Dreyfus on Intelligence and Skillful Coping 
To understand Dreyfus’s theory of skillful coping it is helpful to understand the 
critique against which it emerged.  Now classic itself, Dreyfus’s critique of clas-
sical (or computational, or “Good Old Fashioned”) AI goes something like this: 
AI research is built upon two interrelated assumptions, both of which are false.  
First, that intelligence fundamentally is information processing (i.e., the manipula-
tion of context-free symbols according to formal rules or algorithms); and second, 
that everything knowable about the world can be rendered in terms of discrete, in-
dependent representations.  “In brief,” Dreyfus writes in an early paper, “the belief 
in the possibility of AI, given present computers, is the belief that all that is essen-
tial to human intelligence can be formalized” (Dreyfus 1967: 1).  But as Dreyfus 
points out, following Heidegger, Wittgenstein and others, there is a principled dis-
tinction between two aspects of human intelligence—knowing that (i.e., factual 
knowledge and reasoning about it) and knowing how (i.e., skills, behaviors, prac-
tices, etc.).  On the computational view, knowing that is understood as fundamen-
tal, and all other intelligent skills and behaviors—everything from understanding 
language to recognizing faces—are taken simply to be “problems of complexity” 
(Dreyfus 1993: 55).  That is to say, classical AI takes know-how to be derived 
from (and thus explainable in terms of) knowing-that.  For Dreyfus, however, 
nothing could be further from the truth.  Indeed, as he demonstrates, the computa-
tional view is not merely false, it is backwards.  Our know-how is what fundamen-
tally enables us to ‘cope’ with the world around us, not our formal reasoning.  The 
former makes possible the latter.   
The crux of Dreyfus’s argument is that contrary to formalist desires, (1) meaning 
is inherently context-dependent, and (2) context-dependence in principle can’t be 
formalized, because contexts are inherently indeterminate.  Consider the following 
example, borrowed from Wittgenstein: walking down a country road, you come 
across a sign-post with an arrow on it.  How do you know what the sign means?  
Should you follow the direction of the arrow or go in the opposite direction?  Per-
haps the sign is some sort of practical joke or was posted by someone who has a 
different understanding of arrows.  What if the road curves?  Should you deviate 
from it to continue in a straight line or follow along the curve?  Is it significant that 
the sign is red?  Or that a bird is flying in a particular direction overhead?  It might 
be, if by local convention red signs indicate that one should follow the opposite di-
rection of the arrow, or if one happened to know something about avian migration 
patterns.  But then again it might not.  The possibilities are endless. 
This problem, known in linguistics and AI research as the “Frame Problem,”  
is at bottom a matter of determining relevance.  “Framing” something means  
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determining the appropriate context within which to understand it, and doing that 
amounts to determining what is and isn’t relevant to its meaning.  In the above ex-
ample, understanding that the arrow on the sign means “go this way” necessarily 
involves knowing a few things about signs (and indeed, arrows).  First of all, one 
must recognize it as a sign (instead of, say, a place to lock your bicycle).  That 
way, one can determine that what is relevant to interpreting it has mostly to do 
with what is written on it (and not, say, its sturdiness, how well it is anchored in 
the ground, and so on).  But even that initial recognition of the sign as a sign re-
quires a larger context—namely, the context of being in the middle of a journey, 
and not at its end.  Yet determining that context requires an even larger one, with-
in which to understand the concept of a “journey.”  And so on, ad infinitum.  De-
termining the appropriate context for understanding some phenomenon always re-
quires appealing to another, larger context.  Treating the problem formalistically 
therefore leads inevitably to regress.5 
Since we, intelligent creatures, are nevertheless fully capable of doing it, of un-
derstanding things and the situations in which they arise, it seems then that we 
must do it in some other (non-formal, non-computational) way.  Indeed, Dreyfus 
argues (following Heidegger), that the frame problem only arises in the first place 
because formalists have misunderstood the nature of intelligence.  Formalists be-
lieve that intelligent creatures are confronted with situations, when in fact what 
normally happens is that we find ourselves in them.6 On the former picture, an in-
telligence comprised of context-free facts and formal rules for manipulating them 
must reckon with a world of meaning fundamentally unlike itself—an unruly 
world, one which is contextual and indeterminate.  It must either find or create a 
context within which to understand the phenomena at hand.  The latter picture, 
however, suggests that the world and the intelligent actors in it are essentially of 
one piece.  One need not find a context, for one is always already in one.  This 
view suggests that we ought to understand the meaningful world as our world, as 
the world in which we are necessarily embedded, the world in which we live and 
act, and about which, sometimes, we think.  The world understood in these  
terms is not a world comprised fundamentally of facts, but rather of tendencies, 
behaviors, practices, and skills.  (It is comprised of facts, too, of course, but not 
fundamentally).  This alternative to the formalist picture describes a world that is 
comprised, at bottom, of know-how.  Furthermore, insofar as it is our world it is 
                                                          
5 Dreyfus argues that this can be seen most clearly in modern formalist attempts at con-
structing psychological (or intentional) laws—in cognitive science, for example.  The 
chief aim of cognitive scientists, according to Jerry Fodor, is to define computational me-
chanisms (i.e., formal rules or algorithms) that explain intentional laws (Fodor 1991: 20).  
All such laws, however, must contain ceteris paribus conditions.  That is, they are neces-
sarily ‘non-strict’, or apply ‘everything else being equal’ (21).  Dreyfus argues that the 
ceteris paribus clause is essentially formal notation representing the background of hu-
man knowledge, and that “what ‘everything else’ and ‘equal’ means in any specific situa-
tion can never be fully spelled out without regress” (Dreyfus 1993: 57). 
6 Of course, we are sometimes confronted with a situation. Which is to say, we sometimes 
have to understand a situation from the perspective of an outside observer, such as when 
we watch a movie or the news.  On the account I am presenting here, however, our capac-
ity to understand such situations is parasitic upon a more fundamental form of under-
standing—namely, absorbed skillful coping. 
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one in which we fundamentally have a stake, a vested interest.  The meaningful 
world is one about which intelligent actors have no choice but to be concerned.  
Sure, human beings may, at our relatively high level of intelligence, choose how to 
care about it, choose what to value more and what to value less.  But insofar as we 
must act we are shaped and guided by our basic, inescapable interest in the way 
that activity relates us to and positions us within the world.7   
On the whole, this background of know-how thus functions as a sort of global 
or ultimate context, shaping how we perceive the situations we find ourselves in, 
pre-reflectively selecting what is relevant for understanding them.  Which is to 
say, our relationship to (and understanding of) the world is, at bottom, structured 
by our skills and skillful activity, and it is directed toward the satisfaction of those 
interests around which such skills develop in the first place.  Put another way, this 
background enables us to cope.  And it is here, for Dreyfus, that the body enters 
the picture.  For in order to explain exactly how it is that this kind of coping or 
skillful coping works, he argues that we must look to our bodies.   
At each moment and in every situation the body guides our sense of what is re-
levant, he claims, and it does so in three ways.  The first has to do with brain ar-
chitecture:  “The possible responses to a given input must be constrained by […] 
this innate structure [which] accounts for phenomena such as the perceptual con-
stants that are given from the start by the perceptual system as if they had always 
already been learned” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999: 117).  The brain, that is, acting 
as a transducer of sensory information intrinsically limits, by virtue of its physical 
architecture, the possible ways a situation can be perceived.  We see only a certain 
part of the light spectrum, hear only certain wavelengths of sound, and the brain, 
though flexible, combines and interprets such sensory input in a relatively stable 
manner.  The second way Dreyfus calls “body-dependent order of presentation.”   
This describes how the physical structure of the body delimits the possible ways 
one might act in or interact with a given situation, and thus determines the range 
of possible ways one might understand it.  “Things nearby that afford reaching,” 
for example, “will be experienced early and often,” etc. (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1999: 118).  The world is one in which we must act, and our bodies are such that 
only certain kinds of actions in certain situations are possible.  Thus our under-
standing of the world is shaped each moment by the presence or absence of those 
various possibilities.  Finally, the body guides our sense of what is relevant by 
aiming for what, following Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus calls maximum grip—“the 
body’s tendency to refine its discriminations and to respond to solicitations in such 
a way as to bring the current situation closer to the optimal gestalt that the skilled 
agent has learned to expect” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999: 103).  That is to say, the 
agent’s overall sense of a situation implies an optimal relationship between the 
agent and the environment and “those input/output pairs will count as similar  
that move the organism towards maximum grip, which is itself a function of  
                                                          
7 This anticipatory dimension of meaning is crucial and has to do with what Heidegger calls 
“care.”  See Dreyfus on Heidegger on care in Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commen-
tary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 
238-45; Dreyfus, “Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Mak-
ing it More Heideggerian,” Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 247-268.  
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body-structure” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999: 118).  Skillful activity is activity 
which can be more or less effective, successful or not.  And the body is a barome-
ter of this implicit normativity, tending naturally toward an agent-environment re-
lationship in which its actions are best positioned to succeed.   
In sum, on Dreyfus’s account the body anchors us at the center of a perspective; 
it opens up a world.  And it does so in three ways: first, by acting as a sensorial 
sieve, limiting at the outset what about the physical world can be perceived; 
second, by structuring the immediate environment around possibilities for action; 
and third, by pre-reflectively orienting movement toward the optimal relationship 
to (and understanding of) a given situation or some object in view.  In other 
words, the body is what makes it possible to discover at any given moment that 
certain parts of the world are relevant to our interests or that they aren’t, indeed to 
have interests at all.  Our bodies embed us in a world of meaningful relations, 
make those relations matter to us, enable us to understand them (and ourselves in 
relation to them), and guide our activities in and through them. 
2   Bickhard on Interaction and Recursive Self-maintenance 
Mark Bickhard has developed a theory of cognition that is very much in the spirit 
of Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping.  Only instead of taking human intelligence 
as his object of analysis, as Dreyfus does, Bickhard aims to investigate intelli-
gence construed more broadly. Bickhard thus articulates his theory in rather more 
general terms than Dreyfus does—namely, in terms not of the human body or  
human intelligence, but of the structures and functions of physical processes and 
systems.  I take Bickhard’s account to be so valuable for artificial intelligence re-
search precisely for this reason, that it describes the actual requirements a physical 
system must meet in order to produce the capacity for some form of intelligence. 
It does not require that such systems are structured exactly like human beings; it 
merely requires that at some basic level humans and any such system have some 
organizational properties in common.8 
                                                          
8 It should be noted at the outset that there appears to be a significant disparity between 
these two views.  Dreyfus explicitly offers his approach as an alternative to representa-
tionalist views (i.e., those which take as a premise the notion that discrete, independent, 
content-bearing mental representations form the basic building blocks of intelligence.)  
Bickhard, on the other hand, specifically frames his interactivist theory as a new approach 
to theorizing representations.  I believe that this apparent incompatibility is merely super-
ficial.  In the first place, Dreyfus does not deny the existence of mental representations; 
he merely denies that they are the fundamental components of cognition.  That is to say, 
he rejects representationalism, not representations.  Bickhard rejects representationalism 
too, only he calls it “encodingism” instead of “representationalism.” And since Bick-
hard’s whole project (with regard to representations) is to explain the processes that  
constitute them, he obviously agrees that they are not fundamental.  Rather, on his inte-
ractivist account, certain kinds of complex physical processes produce representations.  If 
my intuitions are correct, those complex processes are tantamount to Dreyfusian skills or 
know-how, and could presumably somehow produce representations for Dreyfus as well. 
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Bickhard’s model centers around a type of open thermodynamic system known 
as a “dissipative structure.”  Such systems are characterized by the fact that they 
operate at far-from-thermodynamic-equilibrium conditions and cease to exist if 
such conditions are not maintained (Bickhard 2004: 11).  Examples of such sys-
tems range from simple convection systems, such as those responsible for wind 
and rain, to the most complex systems in the universe—living organisms.  Fur-
thermore, within the class of far-from-equilibrium systems, a distinction can be 
made between those that require the explicit intervention of another system for 
maintaining its far-from-equilibrium conditions, and those which are able to some 
extent to maintain those conditions themselves (Bickhard 2004: 11).  As an exam-
ple of the former Bickhard points to a chemical bath, which requires that certain 
chemicals be constantly pumped into it in order to maintain its far-from-
equilibrium state; an example of the latter is a candle flame, which “maintains 
above combustion threshold temperature; it melts wax so that it percolates up the 
wick; it vaporizes wax in the wick into fuel; [and] in standard atmospheric gravita-
tional conditions, it induces convection, which brings in fresh oxygen and gets rid 
of waste” (Bickhard 2004: 11).  
Bickhard refers to systems—such as the candle flame—which contribute to the 
preservation of their own far-from-equilibrium conditions as “self-maintaining 
systems”.  Any such system is, by definition, in constant interaction with its envi-
ronment, because “self-maintenance is a(n emergent) property that is relative to a 
range of environments” (Bickhard 2004: 23).  For instance, in the case of the can-
dle flame, its self-maintaining processes will fail to preserve far-from-equilibrium 
conditions—whereby the system (flame) will cease to exist—if its environment 
changes in certain ways, such as there being no more wax or oxygen, etc.  There 
are, however, more complex systems than candle flames, and some such systems 
can interact with their environments in more complex ways. 
The candle flame has no options, but other systems do.  A bacterium, for example, 
might swim so long as it is swimming up a sugar gradient, but tumble if it finds itself 
swimming down a sugar gradient […] The swimming is self-maintaining so long as 
it is oriented toward higher sugar concentrations, but it is not self-maintaining if it is 
oriented toward lower sugar gradients.  Conversely with tumbling.  So, swimming is 
self-maintenant [sic] under some conditions and not under others, and the bacterium 
can detect the difference in the conditions and switch its activities accordingly; it can 
select between a pair of possible interactive processes that which would be 
appropriate for current (orientation) conditions (Bickhard 2004: 23-4).  
In other words, the bacterium can (inter)actively maintain its very process of self-
maintenance by distinguishing between variable environmental conditions—that 
is, by distinguishing between the presence of food (more sugar) and not-food (less 
sugar).  It possesses interconnected subsystems, each of which can behave in  
different ways depending on the states of the other systems.  This ability to  
(inter)actively detect what counts as the proper functioning of a system, given  
certain environmental conditions, is what Bickhard refers to as recursive self-
maintenance (Bickhard 2004: 24).  And it is this capacity that he suggests gives 
rise to cognition. 
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To see how this happens, consider the bacterium again.  We saw, above, that in 
order to select whether to swim or tumble, it must be able to differentiate between 
environments that make one or the other behavior self-maintaining.  Of course, we 
wouldn’t say that when swimming it must, therefore, know that it is moving up a 
sugar gradient.  How, then, can we explain what goes on when it detects environ-
mental conditions, and the result of that detection causes it to behave (i.e., to inte-
ract further with the environment) some way rather than another?  Bickhard’s  
response comes in two parts: first, the state of some subsystem (e.g., a subsystem 
that detects sugar) “implicitly define[s] the class of environments that would yield 
that state if in fact encountered in an interaction” (Bickhard and Terveen 1995: 
60); and second, some other subsystem (e.g., one which selects whether to swim 
or tumble) functionally presupposes that the environment is a certain way—based 
on the current state of the ‘first’ subsystem—and responds accordingly (Bickhard 
2004: 25).  The state of the first subsystem, that is, implies that certain environ-
mental conditions obtain (and that others don’t) in the same way that the mercury 
level of a thermometer reaching the notch marked “73 F” implies that it is seventy 
three degrees Fahrenheit (and that it is not forty three degrees Fahrenheit).  The 
second subsystem then acts based on the discrimination made by the first.  Bick-
hard calls this process, wherein one subsystem utilizes the state of another, func-
tional presupposition.  Thus on the interactive model one subsystem utilizes the 
state of another—the former functionally presupposes what is implied by the lat-
ter—to determine the type of behavior that will contribute to the maintenance of 
its own far-from-equilibrium conditions in a given situation.  This complex 
process is, for Bickhard, the foundation of intelligent behavior.  
While it is outside the scope of this paper to elaborate either Bickhard’s or 
Dreyfus’s picture more fully, I believe that we can already see a shared under-
standing of intelligence at work.9  For both theorists, intelligence is a matter, more 
or less, of acting skillfully to satisfy one’s needs and interests, and where doing so 
means interacting dynamically with the world in which one is fundamentally, in-
exorably embedded.  Indeed, it seems to me that the process described above, 
wherein a physical system maintains its own existence conditions by successfully 
discriminating between healthy and toxic environments and by tending toward the 
former, is skillful coping in its simplest form, that this is a description of Drey-
fus’s concept of skillful coping at a higher level of generality.  Furthermore, and to 
return to the question with which this essay began, I would like to suggest that 
Bickhard’s characterization of recursively self-maintaining physical systems is as 
good a definition as any of what physically constitutes a body. 
What is indispensable about Bickhard’s view is that it glimpses these funda-
mental components of skillful coping in even their most primitive incarnations.  
And Bickhard does so not only by pointing metaphorically to the sort of “lower” 
cognitive functioning which humans share with non-human animals, as Dreyfus 
does, but by elaborating how such primitive intelligence works and how “higher 
                                                          
9 I have argued at greater length for the parallel between Dreyfus’s and Bickhard’s concep-
tions of skillful coping and interactive cognition, respectively, in “Challenging the Bi-
nary: Toward an Ecological Theory of Intentionality,” my 2007 philosophy honors thesis 
at The George Washington University. 
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level” intelligence might plausibly arise out of it.  This is important because it en-
courages us to think about intelligence from the ground up, so to speak, rather than 
from the top down.  It gives us a way of thinking about building artificial intelli-
gence, instead of artificial human intelligence.  That is, it suggests why and how 
we ought to think about building simple artificially intelligent systems, rather than 
attempting to reverse-engineer ourselves.  In what remains, I will elaborate on this 
a bit, and suggest what I take it to mean, practically, for AI research. 
3   Three Considerations for Future Research 
Reading Dreyfus and Bickhard together leads to a generalized conception of the 
body as an open thermodynamic system with the capacity to contribute to the 
maintenance of its own existence conditions by interacting skillfully with its envi-
ronment.10  And while I am unable here to argue more fully and persuasively for 
this view, I would like to suggest that understanding bodies in this way brings cer-
tain important features of the relationship between intelligence and embodiment to 
the fore.   
First, it indicates that bodies and intelligence are not distinct things.  The claim 
that the body is fundamental to all facets of intelligent life is not merely the claim 
that bodies and intelligence are co-extensive, that wherever intelligence is found 
so too is there a body.  Rather, it is the much stronger claim that bodies are intelli-
gent.  The more or less discrete physical systems we call bodies are just the sort of 
physical systems with the capacity to interact skillfully with their environments.  
The distinction between bodies and intelligence is an analytical distinction—it re-
fers to two aspects of the same phenomenon (its physical properties and its skills 
or capacities).   
This is a point which seems to me to have been lost on many of those who take 
Dreyfus’s work very seriously.  Thus one finds AI researchers attempting to strap 
humanoid robot “bodies” onto complex computers, or conversely, trying to cap-
ture the dynamics of embodiment in complex digital models.11  In both cases, the 
body is understood as something that intelligence requires, a necessary feature 
which must be supplied or involved or made reference to, instead of being unders-
tood as what intelligence is.  But the point that Dreyfus is making in his work is 
precisely that such a conception is misguided, that intelligence and the body are 
inseparable, that they are two sides of the same coin, that they develop together in 
the world, that intelligent creatures are intelligent because they are embodied, and 
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that similar definitions have been put forward to describe life.  And in-
deed, for many of the reasons outlined above, I would not be surprised if artificial intel-
ligence and artificial life were developed simultaneously.  Put another way, I think truly 
artificially intelligent systems will be difficult to distinguish from living ones. 
11 The former is evident in work such as Rodney Brooks and Daniel Dennett’s “Cog” 
project, the latter in Walter Freeman’s “neurodynamic modeling.”  For detailed accounts 
of both of these approaches, as well as a general survey of the state of the art in  
“Heideggerian AI,” see Dreyfus, “Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it 
Would Require Making it More Heideggerian,” op. cit.  
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as a result, that intelligence must be understood in terms of embodied activity in 
the world.12  For AI researchers going forward, then, the first point to consider is 
that artificial intelligence and artificial embodiment must be developed in tandem.  
“Hardware” and “software” cannot be understood as fundamentally distinct.  In-
stead, the very organizational structure of physical systems must be designed to 
produce intelligent behavior.  In order to develop truly intelligent systems, we 
must design physical systems whose raisons d'être are to cope with their environ-
ments.13   
Second, as the above suggests, this requires thinking about artificial intelli-
gence on a much smaller scale.  Instead of aiming for complex intelligent systems, 
researchers should try to build physical systems with small skill sets, but which al-
so have the flexibility to adapt and learn.  In this way, complexity can emerge out 
of simple intelligent systems.14  Genetic programming and “generative AI” seem 
to me to be promising avenues of research that approach AI in just this way.15  So 
too is the “enactive approach,” developed most prominently by Evan Thompson 
and Francisco Varela.  That approach offers a conception of the relationship be-
tween embodiment and intelligence similar to the one advocated here and has pro-
duced significant work in philosophy and cognitive science.16 
Finally, understanding intelligence and the body in the way I’ve described sug-
gests that AI researchers ought to be thinking not only about how intelligent crea-
tures are intelligent, but also about why they are intelligent.  As Dreyfus has 
shown, following Heidegger, meaningfulness and intelligence arise in the pursuit 
of interests, in relation to a world in which one is inexorably embedded—a world 
about which one has no choice but to care.  Bickhard’s conception of recursively 
self-maintaining systems brings this notion into even sharper relief: building be-
ings that understand the world—in whatever way they do—and that are able, 
therefore, to behave intelligently in the world, means building beings that need to 
be intelligent in order to successfully function.  This constitutive need for intelli-
gence is crucial to understanding intelligence as such.17  The body is what produc-
es this need, what anchors intelligent creatures in the world, what invests us in it, 
what makes the world relevant and significant to us, what makes it such that we 
have to cope.  Bodies, in a word, are why intelligence matters. 
                                                          
12 This is another way of describing what Merleau-Ponty calls “the flesh,” a notion which 
has undoubtedly shaped Dreyfus’s thinking.   
13 For a marvelous discussion of both theoretical and experimental work related to this idea, 
see Slawomir Nasuto and Mark Bishop’s “Of (Zombie) Mice and Animats” in this vo-
lume. 
14 For a helpful discussion of how this kind of emergence works, see Bickhard, “Emer-
gence,” in Downward Causation, ed. P. B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann, P. 
V. Christiansen,   322-348. (Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus Press, 2000). 
15 See Tijn van der Zant, Generative AI: A Neo-Cybernetic Analysis (Groningen: University 
Library Groningen).  
16 For an overview of the enactive approach, see Thompson’s Mind in Life: Biology, Phe-
nomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2007). 
17 See Nasuto and Bishop’s paper (op cit.) for more on the constitutive need for and drive 
toward intelligence.  
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